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ABSTRACT 
 
Stock options are used to motivate investments in risky projects, such as R&D investments. When 
compensation committees make granting decisions to stimulate R&D spending, they should 
consider the following firm characteristics: (1) a firm’s growth opportunities; (2) a firm’s financial 
leverage; and (3) the CEO’s stock ownership prior to stock option grants. This paper addresses 
the effectiveness of CEO stock option granting decisions by examining whether compensation 
committees take these three factors into account. Using a recent sample over the period of 
1992-2006, we find that firms with greater growth opportunities and firms in lower financial 
leverage are more likely to award CEO stock options to motivate R&D investment. These findings 
are consistent with that options are designed effectively to motivate managerial risk taking, 
thereby aligning the interests of managers with those of shareholders. However, contrary to our 
prediction, compensation committees tend to grant more to CEOs with larger stock ownership to 
induce R&D spending. A potential explanation for this finding is that CEOs with relatively large 
stock ownership affect the granting process and grant themselves with excessive stock options. 
Taken together, the evidence of CEO stock option granting process partially supports the notion 
that firms make effective stock option plans to mitigate incentive problems of risk-averse 
managers.  
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1. Introduction 
 
EO stock options granted by U.S. firms rose dramatically in the past two decades.
1
 Theoretically, 
executive stock options provide incentives for risk-averse managers to invest in risky but 
value-enhancing projects on behalf of risk-neutral shareholders (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976). For 
example, executive stock options affect managers’ decisions of undertaking risky projects (Rajgopal and Shevlin 
2002). However, excessive stock options granted to executives relative to firms’ modest performance improvement 
frequently provoke criticism. Prior studies find that the costs of stock options are large (Morgenson 1998; Leonhardt 
2000; Meulbroek 2003; Ikaheimo et al. 2004). Furthermore, the managerial incentive to increase stock price is not 
monotonically increasing in the executive’s option wealth (Tian 2004). Due to these concerns with granting stock 
options, it is not always desirable for firms to maximize stock option grants to motivate CEOs.  
 
 
 
                                                        
This paper is revised from a term paper while being a doctoral student at Kent State University. I am grateful for the suggestions 
of Pervaiz Alam. I also appreciate comments from William Brown (the discussant) and the participants at the 2004 AAA 
Northeast Regional Meeting. I am indebted to Peng Cui, Lili Xie, and Gwen White for reviewing this paper for me.  
1 Hall and Murphy (2002) estimate that stock options represent approximately 40% of CEO’s total compensation for S&P 500 
companies in 1998. This is up from only 25% of total pay in 1992. More recently, the 2001 annual survey of executive pay by the 
Business Week estimates that options account for 80% of total CEO pay. 
C 
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The purpose of this paper is to empirically investigate the factors companies consider when they grant CEO 
stock options to motivate risky investments: research and development (R&D) projects. CEOs are concerned with 
short-term accounting and stock performance, and these concerns generate incentives for CEOs to reduce R&D 
spending (e.g., Cheng 2004). Also, the future benefits of R&D projects are generally uncertain (e.g., Chan et al. 
2001; Kothari et al. 2002). Furthermore, compared with other managerial investments, R&D projects are relatively 
difficult to monitor because of the higher information asymmetry between managers and shareholders (e.g., Clinch 
1991). Due to these reasons, CEOs tend to cut R&D spending. Since stock options are a mechanism to mitigate 
risk-related incentive problems and the value of stock options depends on the market price, compensation 
committees will use stock options to influence CEOs’ incentives to invest in R&D projects. The focus of this study 
is on the stock options paid to chief executive officers (CEOs). CEOs have direct control over R&D investment and 
granting stock options to them may significantly reduce their reluctance to invest in the risky projects.
2
  
 
 Prior studies investigate firm-specific characteristics that provide incentives for firms to grant stock 
options (e.g., Yermack 1995; Goodwin and Kent 2004). These firm characteristics are: (1) a firm’s growth 
opportunities, (2) a firm’s financial leverage, and (3) the CEO’s stock ownership prior to stock option grants. When 
compensation committees make granting decisions to stimulate R&D spending, they should consider these 
firm/CEO characteristics. In this paper, we examine whether the above three factors regarding firm/CEO 
characteristics explain the extent to which compensation committees attempt to use stock options to stimulate R&D 
spending. As discussed earlier, stock option grants are a major means for shareholders to stimulate risky investments. 
Therefore, examining whether the stock option grants are designed appropriately to motivate managerial risk-taking 
is a suitable approach to address the effectiveness of stock option granting decisions. In addition, we use a sample 
over the period of 1992-2006, during which the SEC requires the disclosure of stock option granting plans. This 
disclosing requirement may discipline the compensation committees’ work and thus, may enhance the effectiveness 
of stock options granting.  
 
 Using 954 sample firms from the Standard and Poor’s 1500 list, we find that the compensation committee 
more positively links CEO stock option grants with the R&D investment in order to motivate R&D spending (1) for 
a firm facing greater growth opportunities than for a firm facing less growth opportunities, (2) when a firm’ financial 
leverage is relatively low. However, the compensation committee tends to grant more stock options to motivate 
R&D spending when the CEO has relatively large stock ownership. One potential explanation is that CEOs with 
significant stock ownership affect the contracting process and grant themselves with more options.  
 
This paper contributes to both the literature and the industry. This study extends Cheng (2004) by 
identifying additional factors that influence compensation committees’ incentives to motivate R&D spending. Cheng 
(2004) documents that compensation committees are more likely to use stock options to motivate R&D spending 
when managers may opportunistically reduce R&D spending (two factors). In this paper, we show that the use of 
stock options to motivate R&D spending is also contingent on firm’s financing and investment conditions as well as 
CEO stock ownership. 
 
This study has managerial implications as well by shedding light on how compensation committees attempt 
to design stock option plans to mitigate incentive problems of managers. We identify three factors that explain 
compensation committees’ attempt of using stock options to encourage R&D spending. These factors should be 
considered to implement the CEO stock option plans.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Next section reviews related literature. Section 3 develops testable 
hypotheses. Section 4 presents research methodology. Section 5 discusses sample construct and data sources. 
Section 6 presents empirical results. In Section 7, we summarize the major findings and conclude.  
 
 
 
                                                        
2 Examining CEO stock options also facilitates the comparisons with prior studies on compensation committees’ stock option 
granting decisions. Furthermore, CEO (as opposed to other executives) compensation is the subject that has received the most 
intensive debate among various shareholders in the firm (Rajgopal and Shevlin 2002; Murphy 2003). 
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2. Literature Review 
 
2.1   Effects Of Executive Stock Options  
 
Despite the pervasive use of executive stock options, there is no consensus of their ex post effects. As 
summarized by Hanlon et al. (2003), there are two opposing perspectives towards issuing executive (including CEO) 
stock options: the incentive alignment perspective and the rent extraction perspective. The incentive alignment 
perspective states that options are granted to reduce the moral hazard problem that stems from senior managers 
owning very little of the firms they manage. A substantial body of theoretical work beginning with Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) suggests that stock option contracts can align managers’ incentives with those of shareholders. For 
example, Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) document that executive stock options affect managers’ decisions of 
undertaking risky but positive net present value projects. Using a sample of oil and gas firms, they investigate 
exploration risk, the risk of uncertain success in exploring for new oil and gas reserves. 
 
The rent extraction perspective, however, states that senior managers control the pay-setting process and 
compensate themselves in excess of the level optimal for shareholders. Researchers with this perspective find that 
stock options are an inefficient way to compensate managers (e.g., Jenter 2001; Hall and Murphy 2002; Meulbroek 
2003).  
 
In addition, excessive stock options granted to executives relative to firms’ modest performance 
improvement frequently provoke criticism. First, the costs of stock options are large. Shareholders and other 
stakeholders worry about the cost of stock option grants in terms of dilution and the resulting share repurchases 
needed to stem that dilution (e.g., Morgenson 1998; Leonhardt 2000). Ikaheimo et al. (2004) study a sample of 
Finnish firms and find that the dilution effect has a negative impact on stock returns. The deadweight cost associated 
with executive stock options is also quite large (Meulbroek 2003). Second, the managerial incentive to increase 
stock price is not monotonically increasing in the executive’s stock option wealth (Tian 2004).  
 
2.2 Compensation Committee Granting Considerations 
 
Prior studies document that compensation committees adjust the GAAP earnings specified in incentive 
plans to shield compensation from income-decreasing effects of restructuring charges (Dechow et al. 1994), 
extraordinary losses (Gaver and Gaver 1998), strategic expenditures (Duru et al. 2002) as well as income-increasing 
effects of SFAS No. 106 (Kren and Leauby 1997). Making adjustments in these situations reveals the considerations 
of compensation committees in CEO cash compensation.   
 
Given that stock option is becoming a dominant component of CEO compensation package since 1990’s, 
examining the practice in stock option granting becomes increasingly interesting and important. In general, it is the 
compensation committee’s responsibility to make appropriate stock option plans. The negative effects of stock 
options raise doubts about the effectiveness of stock option granting process. If stock option grants are properly 
constructed, they can be highly effective in aligning CEOs incentives with those of shareholders (Greenspan 2002). 
Conversely, if the stock options are not awarded properly, then the stock options would not function effectively in 
motivating the managers’ incentives. 
 
Cheng (2004) shows that compensation committees effectively mitigate opportunistic reductions in R&D 
expenditures by positively linking stock option adjustments with R&D spending. It provides supporting evidence on 
the effectiveness of stock options grants in motivating risky investment. In this study, we argue that compensation 
committees should consider more firm characteristics when they make granting decisions to motivate R&D 
spending. Thus, the current study is an extension to Cheng (2004). 
 
Yermack (1995) studies the impact of firm/CEO characteristics on stock options. The author conjectures 
that incentives provided by stock option awards will be larger in firms with valuable growth opportunities, in firms 
with lower financial leverage, and when CEOs hold a small fraction of their own firms’ equity. He then uses 
pay-performance sensitivity to measure the incentives generated by stock options and regresses pay-performance 
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sensitivity of stock options on the three firm characteristics. He finds no support for his arguments. The possible 
reason is that he uses an incomplete measure of stock option incentives. His measure is subject to at least two 
limitations. First, as realized by Yermack (1995), his measure focuses on the incentives provided by new awards 
without considering those incentives provided by stock options granted in prior years. He was not able to construct 
reliable estimates of the incentives from CEOs’ accumulated stock option awards due to data constraints. Second, 
pay-performance sensitivity is a biased measure of managerial incentives and it systematically overstates the 
incentives generated by stock options (Jenter 2001).  
 
Using Australian firms as their sample, Goodwin and Kent (2004) investigate the firm specific 
characteristics that provide ex ante incentives for firms to utilize an executive stock option plan. They find that a 
firm is more likely to utilize a stock option plan as the firm faces more investment opportunities. They also find a 
positive relationship between the level of remuneration received by the CEO and the existence of an ESO plan. But 
they do not find a relation between a firm’s level of debt and its use of an executive stock option plan. Goodwin and 
Kent (2004) focus on the issue of whether firms use a stock option plan is contingent on certain firm/CEO 
characteristics, such as CEO remuneration, investment opportunities, and financial leverage. In the current study, we 
extend their study by examining how the same three firm characteristics affect the extent to which firms use stock 
options to stimulate R&D spending.   
 
3. Hypotheses Development 
 
3.1  R&D And Stock Option Compensation 
 
Boards of directors determine stock options granted to CEOs, or they delegate powers to compensation 
committees to fix or approve the compensation of executives.
3
 They meet multiple times a year to vote and 
determine compensation schemes. Compensation committees have a significant amount of discretion in deciding on 
the magnitude of CEO stock options and their decisions are subjective relative to the decisions on cash 
compensation.  
 
In this paper, we focus on the use of stock options to induce risk taking in R&D projects.  Compensation 
committees attempt to make a positive connection between stock option grants and R&D spending to reward or 
motivate risk taking. The reasons are as follows. First, compensation committees believe that there is a tendency for 
risk-averse CEOs to cut R&D spending. R&D projects are generally associated with greater certainty of the future 
benefits (e.g., Chan et al. 2001; Kothari et al. 2002). In addition, the negative impact of R&D spending on current 
accounting earning is due to the fact that R&D spending is typically immediately expensed under U.S. GAAP. CEO 
may also consider R&D investments as less desirable than other investments in terms of the impact of the 
investments on short-term stock prices (e.g., Cheng 2004). In sum, CEOs are concerned with short-term accounting 
and stock performance, and these concerns generate incentives for CEOs to reduce R&D spending. The second 
reason for compensation committees to reward R&D spending using stock options is that, relative to other 
investments, R&D projects are often associated with higher information asymmetry between managers and 
shareholders (e.g., Clinch 1991). In order to align managers’ preferences with those of shareholders, compensation 
should ideally be linked to performance. Because it is hard to monitor the quality of R&D investment, stock option 
grants tied to R&D spending help enhance the chance that only “good” R&D investments are induced or rewarded 
(Cheng 2004).   
 
3.2.  Variation In The Relation Between R&D And CEO Stock Option Compensation  
 
Despite the fact that stock options can serve as a mechanism to induce desirable risk taking, increasing 
stock options will not necessarily exert significant influence on managerial actions because motivational effects of 
stock options may vary. Cheng (2004) has identified two factors that explain the contemporaneous association 
between changes in R&D spending and changes in CEO compensation. In this study, we extend his study by 
examining additional factors that affect compensation committees’ attempt to motivate R&D spending. 
                                                        
3 Compensation committees are also responsible for executive stock option grants other than those for CEOs. 
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We argue that three factors will affect the extent to which compensation committees should motivate R&D 
spending using stock options. And in situations when compensation committees have more incentives to compensate 
managerial risk taking, they will establish a stronger positive association between changes in R&D spending and 
changes in CEO stock option compensation. In contrast, when compensation committees do not want to motivate 
managerial risk taking, the link between stock option grants with R&D spending will be weak. We predict that three 
factors will affect the compensation committees’ incentives to stimulate R&D spending.  
 
The first factor is a firm’s growth opportunities. To what extent compensation committees attempt to 
motivate R&D investment is contingent on firms’ growth opportunities. CEO stock options are useful when direct 
monitoring of management is difficult. In firms with more valuable growth opportunities, managers hold 
considerable private information. Thus, compensation committees have greater difficulty evaluating managers’ 
success in choosing among investments than in firms with fewer growth opportunities. As such, accounting numbers 
are likely to be less reliable for firms to design earning-based compensation (Watts and Zimmerman 1986). Stock 
options, in such a situation, will serve as an alternative approach for firms to compensate CEOs. That is to say, in 
firms with large growth opportunities, compensation committees will grant more stock options to stimulate 
investments in risky projects, such as R&D projects. If this argument is valid, we should observe a stronger positive 
association between changes in R&D expenditures and changes in CEO stock options for firms in face of more 
growth opportunities than for firms in face of fewer growth opportunities. Thus, our first hypothesis in an alternative 
form is: 
 
H1:  Ceteris paribus, the positive association between changes in R&D expenditures and changes in CEO stock 
option awards increases in the firm’s growth opportunities.  
 
Whether compensation committees attempt to motivate more R&D investment also depends on the firms’ 
financial leverage. For a firm in financial leverage, the cost of debt is high. As argued by John and John (1993), if 
managers have strong incentives to maximize firm value, debt holders will demand a higher risk premium for 
supplying capital. Stock options will motivate managers to maximize firm value through pursuing risky investment 
projects (Sanning 2003). As such, debt-holders may view their interests as threatened and impose higher lending 
costs on the firm (Whittred et al. 1999; Coulton and Taylor 2002). Due to this concern, compensation committees 
will not utilize stock options to motivate managers to invest in risky projects. In contrast, when a firm is less 
financially levered, the compensation committee will feel the need to motivate managers to invest in R&D projects. 
Due to the above discussion, our second hypothesis in an alternative form is: 
 
H2:  Ceteris paribus, the positive association between changes in R&D expenditures and changes in CEO stock 
option awards declines with the firm’s financial leverage.  
 
A third factor that affects the relationship between stock option granting decisions and managerial R&D 
decisions is the CEO’s prior ownership, measured by percentage of stock held at the beginning of a year. Theories 
have long identified how levels of managerial stock ownership as a symptom of corporate agency problems (e.g., 
Jensen and Meckling 1976). When CEOs have large stock ownership, their interests are already aligned with those 
of shareholders (Yermack 1995; Bryan et al. 2000). In this situation, stock options are less effective to influence 
R&D spending decisions than when CEOs do not have large stock ownership. If compensation committees take this 
factor into account, they will be more likely to reinforce the association between R&D investment and option 
granting decisions when the CEOs hold relatively few stocks than when the CEOs have relatively large stock 
ownership. Thus, we develop our third hypothesis in an alternative form as follows: 
 
H3:  Ceteris paribus, the positive association between changes in R&D expenditures and changes in CEO stock 
option awards is decreasing in CEO prior stock ownership.  
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4.   Research Methodology 
 
To empirically test our hypotheses, we propose a stock option granting model modified from Cheng (2004) 
as follows: 
∆CEO_OPit = b0 + b1∆R&Dit + b2∆R&Dit×Tobin’s Qit + b3∆R&Dit×Leverageit + b4∆R&Dit×Stock_Ownit +  
 
b5∆R&Dit×Horizonit + b6∆R&Dit×Myopiait + b7Returnit + єit           (1) 
 
where:  
 
CEO_OPit = value of CEO annual stock option grants (in millions) of firm i in fiscal year t, valued at the end of the 
fiscal year using Black-Scholes model adjusted for dividends; 
 
∆CEO_OPit = CEO_OPit – CEO_OPit-1; 
 
R&Dit = R&D expenditures of firm i in fiscal year t, scaled by the average book value of common equity; 
 
∆R&Dit = R&Dit – R&Dit-1; 
 
Tobin’s Qit = (book value of total assetsit + market value of common stockit – book value of common stockit)/book 
value of total assetsit; 
 
Leverageit = ratio of total debts to total assets for firm i in year t; 
 
Stock_ownit = the percentage of the firm’s shares owned by the CEO for firm i in year t; 
 
Horizonit = 1 if the CEO of firm i in year t is 63 or older, and 0 otherwise; 
 
Myopiait = 1 if firm i faces a small earnings decline or a small loss in year t, and 0 otherwise, where (i) Firm i in  
 
year t has a “small earnings decline” if (1) pretax incomeit + R&D expendituresit < pretax incomeit-1 + R&D  
 
expendituresit-1, and (2) pretax incomeit + R&D expendituresit > pretax incomeit-1; (ii) Firm i in year t has a “small  
 
loss” if -1% ≤ pretax incomeit/market value of equityit-1 < 0; 
 
Returnit = annual stock return of firm i in year t. 
 
Cheng’s (2004) model captures the link between the contemporary changes in R&D and the changes in 
CEO stock options. The author uses annual changes in CEO stock options (∆CEO_OP) to measure compensation 
committees’ adjustments in annual stock options. The value of CEO stock options is the value of CEO annual stock 
option grants at the end of the fiscal year estimated by the Black-Scholes model. He uses changes in R&D spending 
(∆R&D) as a proxy for CEO actions in R&D projects. The interaction terms, ∆R&D×Horizon and ∆R&D×Myopia, 
are included in his model because he hypothesizes that changes in R&D spending are more strongly positively 
associated with changes in CEO stock options in two situations: (1) when the CEO approaches retirement (Horizon 
problem), and (2) when the firms faces a small earnings decline or a small loss (Myopia problem). He predicts and 
finds positive signs with the two interaction terms, ∆R&D×Horizon and ∆R&D×Myopia.  
 
In this paper, we modify Cheng’s (2004) model as follows. We first find measures for our three 
hypothesized variables. Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Yermack 1995), we use Tobin’s Q to measure firms’ 
growth opportunities. Tobin’s Q is approximated by adding the book value of assets and the difference between the 
market and book value of common stock, and dividing this total by the book value of assets. Following prior studies, 
we measure financial leverage (Leverage) as the ratio of firms’ total debts to total assets. CEO stock ownership 
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(Stock_Own) is measured as the percentage of the firm’s shares owned by the CEO. To test for our three hypotheses, 
we interact these three variables, Tobin’s Q, Leverage, and Stock_Own, with changes in R&D (∆R&D) and 
incorporate the three interaction terms ∆R&D×Tobin’s Q, ∆R&D×Stock_Own, and ∆R&D×Leverage in Model (1).   
 
A positive coefficient on b2 will support H1, suggesting the changes in R&D spending are more strongly 
positively associated with changes in CEO stock options for firms facing more growth opportunities than for firms 
facing less growth opportunities. Consistent with H2, we expect to find a negative coefficient on b3, which will 
indicate that the changes in R&D spending are more strongly positively associated with changes in CEO stock 
options for firms in lower financial leverage than for firms in greater financial leverage. As hypothesized in H3, we 
expect to find a negative sign on b4, which will suggest that compensation committees make a stronger positive link 
when the CEOs own a smaller number of firm stocks than when the CEOs own a significant number of firm stocks.   
 
In addition, we add stock performance, measured as annual stock return (Return), in the model because 
prior studies document that stock performance has a positive effect on CEO stock option grants (e.g., Baber et al. 
1996; Cheng 2004). We predict a positive sign on Return. 
 
5.  Sample And Data 
 
We find an initial sample of all firms in Standard & Poor’s ExecuComp database over the period 1992-2006. 
The firms included in the database are S&P 1500 (including the S&P 500, the S&P MidCap 400, and the S&P 
SmallCap 600) firms. Prior analytical studies (e.g., Demsetz and Lehn 1985, Smith and Watts 1992) document that 
in highly regulated industry, managers have little discretion in investment decisions and therefore, executive stock 
options generate lower incentives. Following Smith and Watts (1992) and Yermack (1995), we identify regulated 
industries as utility (two-digit SIC code = 49), banking (two-digit SIC code = 60 or 69), and insurance (two-digit 
SIC code = 63). The small size of regulated-industry firms in our sample (9 firm-year observations) does not allow 
an adequate empirical investigation on the differential incentives between regulated industries and non-regulated 
industries. Therefore, we exclude these observations and explore our research hypotheses in a non-regulated industry 
setting. 
  
Data on Black-Scholes value of stock options awarded to CEO, age of CEO, and the percentage of the 
firm’s shares owned by the CEO are obtained from the ExecuComp 2006 database. From ExecuComp 2006 database, 
we also collect financial statement data and market data, including book value of total assets, book value of common 
stock, pretax income, market value of equity, market value of common stock, and one year total return to 
shareholders (Return). Data on total debts, which are used to calculate financial leverage (Leverage) and R&D 
expenditures are retrieved from Compustat.  
  
We identify the CEOs for sample firms by the variable CEOANN in Execucomp. This variable indicates 
whether the executive was the CEO for all or most of the indicated fiscal years. We use the Black-Scholes values as 
the measures of stock options awarded to CEOs in each year. For CEOs receiving multiple stock option grants in 
certain years, we add the grants in each year together and use this total value of all stock option grants received 
during the year for each CEO.  
 
Panel A of Table 1 describes our sample selection criteria. The initial sample includes 24,189 firm-year 
observations representing 1,500 firms. Deleting the highly regulated industries, including utility, insurance and 
banking, reduces the number of observations to 20,943. Then, we eliminate 11,423 observations which have 
incomplete data in Execucomp and Compustat. Age of CEO, percentage of common share outstanding owned by 
CEO and R&D expenditures are three data items with most missing values. Our final sample has 9,052 firm-year 
observations, representing 954 firms.  
  
In Panel B, we report the sample distribution by industry based on two-digit SIC code. Two largest industry 
groups are manufacturing (36.48%) and wholesale and retail (26.42%), followed by service (16.88%) and food and 
chemical (16.67%). This distribution indicates that firms in our final sample are not heavily concentrated in certain 
industries. Therefore, our conclusions may be generalized to all non-regulated industries.  
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Table 1 
Sample Selection 
Panel A: Sample Selection Procedure 
 
 No. of firms No. of observations 
Initial sample 1,500 24,189 
   
Less: Highly-regulated industries: utility (SIC=49), insurance 
(SIC=63), banking (SIC=60,69) 
  
3,246 
  20,943 
Less: Missing data in Execucomp and Compustat  11,423 
   
Final sample size 954 9,052 
 
Panel B: Sample distribution by industry 
 
Industry Two-digit SIC code No. of firms % in sample 
Mining 10, 13, 16 1 0.10% 
Construction 15 7 0.73% 
Food and Chemical 20-29 159 16.67% 
Manufacturing 30-39 348 36.48% 
Transportation 40, 45, 48 26 2.73% 
Wholesale and Retail 50-59 252 26.42% 
Service 70, 72,73, 75, 78-79, 80, 87 161 16.88% 
Total  954 100% 
 
 
6. Empirical Results 
 
 Table 2 presents summary statistics for firms across 1992 to 2006. The mean (median) of annual stock 
options received by CEOs (CEO_OP) is 3.194 (0.934) million. The third quartile is 2.297 million. These statistics 
suggest that less than twenty-five percent of CEOs in our sample firms receive a significant large amount of stock 
options than other firms in the sample. The mean (median) of R&D expenditures (R&D) is 44.722 (15.899) million. 
The third quartile is 39.993 million. This indicates that less than twenty-five percent of our sample firms have 
significantly large R&D investment. The mean (median) change in the natural log value of CEO stock options 
(∆CEO_OP) is -0.146 (-0.124) million. The mean (median) change in R&D expenditures is -0.105 (0) thousand.4  
 
The mean (median) Tobin’s Q, the measure for growth opportunities, is 2.623 (2.903). On average, CEOs 
own 3.668 percent of firms’ common stock, while most CEO stock owns 3.6 percent. The mean (median) of 
financial leverage (Leverage), which is measured as the ratio of total debts to total assets, is 43.9% (58.2%). In 
addition, in 12.2 percent of our sample firms, CEOs are at retirement age and 7.5 percent face a small earning 
decline or a small loss.  
 
Table 3 presents Pearson and Spearman correlations among the variables in Model (1). Pearson (Spearman) 
correlations are reported in the upper (lower) diagonal. The Pearson correlation between ∆CEO_OP and 
∆R&D×Tobin’s Q is not significant, while the Spearman correlation is positively significant. ∆CEO_OP and 
∆R&D×Leverage are not significantly correlated in the Pearson correlation, but significantly negatively correlated in 
the Spearman correlation. The correlations between ∆CEO_OP and ∆R&D×Stock_Own are significant in both 
correlations. 
                                                        
4 Model (1) in this paper is modified from Cheng (2004). Following his model specification, we use the thousand dollars of 
changes in R&D expenditures.  
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics of 954 sample firms (9,052 firm-year observations) from 1992 to 2006 
 
Variables are defined as follows: 
CEO_OPit = value of CEO annual stock option grants (in millions) of firm i in fiscal year t, valued at the end of the fiscal year using Black-Scholes model adjusted for 
dividends; 
∆CEO_OPit = CEO_OPit – CEO_OPit-1; 
R&Dit = R&D expenditures of firm i in fiscal year t, scaled by the average book value of common equity; 
∆R&Dit = R&Dit – R&Dit-1; 
Tobin’s Qit = (book value of total assetsit + market value of common stockit – book value of common stockit)/book value of total assetsit; 
Stock_ownit = the percentage of the firm’s shares owned by the CEO for firm i in year t; 
Leverageit = ratio of total debts to total assets for firm i in year t; 
Horizonit = 1 if the CEO of firm i in year t is 63 or older, and 0 otherwise; 
Myopiait = 1 if firm i faces a small earnings decline or a small loss in year t, and 0 otherwise, where (i) Firm i in year t has a “small earnings decline” if (1) pretax incomeit 
+ R&D expendituresit < pretax incomeit-1 + R&D expendituresit-1, and (2) pretax incomeit + R&D expendituresit > pretax incomeit-1; (ii) Firm i in year t has a “small loss” if 
-1% ≤ pretax incomeit/market value of equityit-1 < 0; 
Returnit = annual stock return of firm i in year t. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Min 
 
1st quartile 
 
Median 
 
3rd quartile 
 
Max 
CEO_OP ($ millions) 3.194 14.01 0.001 0.393 0.934 2.297 369.3 
R&D ($ thousands) 44.72 106 0 2.051 15.899 39.993 1642 
∆CEO_OP ($ millions) -0.146 1.981 -7.569 -1.424 -0.124 1.118 9.543 
∆R&D ($ thousands) -0.105 5.739 -258.5 -0.002 0 0.016 20.68 
Tobin’s Q 2.623 3.047 0.495 1.282 1.802 2.903 77.64 
Leverage 0.439 0.210 0.016 0.271 0.441 0.582 1.467 
Stock_own (in percentage) 3.668 6.274 0.002 0.42 1.265 3.6 43.93 
Horizon 0.122 0.328 0 0 0 0 1 
Myopia 0.075 0.264 0 0 0 0 1 
Return (in percentage) 26.444 97.289 -97.230 -20.737 10.668 45.85 1772.6 
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Table 3 
Pearson and Spearman correlations between variables in Model (1) 
 ∆CEO_OP ∆R&D× 
Tobin’s Q 
∆R&D× 
Stock_Own 
∆R&D× 
Leverage 
∆R&D× 
Horizon 
∆R&D× 
Myopia 
Return 
∆CEO_OP  0.020 
(0.368) 
0.016 
(0.046) 
-0.016 
(0.477) 
-0.004 
(0.860) 
0.013 
(0.057) 
0.029 
(0.193) 
∆R&D×Tobin’s Q 0.093 
(0.001) 
 0.268 
(0.001) 
0.295 
(0.001) 
0.061 
(0.006) 
0.0217 
(0.327) 
-0.038 
(0.082) 
∆R&D×Stock_O
wn 
0.066 
(0.003) 
0.352 
(0.001) 
 0.276 
(0.001) 
0.282 
(0.001) 
0.011 
(0.627) 
-0.043 
(0.050) 
∆R&D×Leverage -0.081 
(0.002) 
0.276 
(0.001) 
0.242 
(0.001)) 
 0.0747 
(0.008) 
0.007 
(0.767) 
-0.051 
(0.022) 
∆R&D×Horizon -0.007 
(0.742) 
0.271 
(0.001) 
0.322 
(0.001) 
0.295 
(0.001) 
 0.040 
(0.073) 
0.018 
(0.413) 
∆R&D×Myopia 0.026 
(0.25) 
0.317 
(0.001) 
0.310 
(0.001) 
0.307 
(0.001) 
0.060 
(0.007) 
 0.041 
(0.067) 
Return 
 
0.073 
( 0.001) 
0.209 
(0.001) 
0.191 
(0.001) 
0.190 
(0.001) 
0.022 
(0.312) 
0.061 
(0.006) 
 
Pearson correlation coefficients are reported above the diagonal and Spearman correlation coefficients below.  
p-values (two-tailed) are reported in parentheses. 
Variables are defined in Table 2. 
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Table 4 presents the regression results of Model (1). Pooled regression results are reported.
5
 The model 
explains 9.38 percent of variation in CEO stock option adjustments (Adjusted R
2
 = 9.38%). The insignificance of 
∆R&D is consistent with Matsunaga (1995), Yermack (1995) and Cheng (2004) who all find that R&D intensity is 
not associated with the value of employee stock options or the sensitivity of the value of CEO stock options to 
performance.  
 
H1 predicts that the contemporaneous positive association between changes in R&D expenditures and 
changes in CEO stock options is more pronounced when the firm faces more valuable growth opportunities. The 
coefficient on ∆R&D×Tobin’Q (b2) is 0.060 with the White-adjusted t-statistic of 2.12 (significant at the 0.05 level), 
which supports H1. This is consistent with the notion that compensation committees are more likely to use stock 
options to motivate R&D spending when they observe a strong growth potential of the firms.  
 
H2 predicts that the contemporaneous positive association between changes in R&D expenditures and 
changes in CEO stock options is stronger when the firm’s financial leverage is lower. The coefficient on 
∆R&D×Leverage (b3) is -0.358. The White-adjusted t-statistic is -3.24 and is significant at the 0.01 level. This result 
supports H2, suggesting that compensation committees are more likely to use stock options to motivate R&D 
spending when the cost of debt is not high.   
 
The coefficient on ∆R&D×Stock_Own is significantly positive (b4 = 0.143, White-adjusted t-statistic = 
1.99). This finding suggests that the positive association between changes in R&D expenditures and changes in CEO 
stock options is more pronounced when the CEO has larger stock ownership than when the CEO has smaller stock 
ownership. In other words, compensation committees tend to grant more to CEOs with significant stock ownership.  
 
One potential explanation for this granting behavior is that CEOs affect compensation decisions when they 
own a large portion of firm stocks. This is more likely to happen when CEOs serve as directors in the boards. This 
evidence corroborates Core et al. (1999), who find that CEOs who are also chairmen of the boards in the 1982-1984 
period were paid more than other CEOs. In line with their finding, Hermalin and Weisbach (2001) argue that the 
greatest factor ensuring the effectiveness of board of directors is its independence from the CEO. Therefore, the 
evidence suggests that the independence of boards of directors appears a key factor in the effectiveness of stock 
option granting decisions. 
 
In addition to the results of the three hypothesized variables, consistent with prior research (e.g., Barber et 
al. 1991; Cheng 2004), annual stock return (Return) is positively associated with changes in CEO stock options (b7 = 
0.001, White-adjusted t-statistic = 3.47). Our findings with the two variables proposed in Cheng (2004), 
∆R&D×Horizon and ∆R&D×Myopia, are as follows. As reported in Table 5, the coefficient on ∆R&D×Horizon is 
significantly negative (b5 = 0.648, White-adjusted t-statistic = 1.93). Consistent with Cheng (2004), this result 
suggests that compensation committees issue more stock options to CEOs based on the increasing R&D investment 
when the CEO approaches retirement. However, the coefficient on ∆R&D×Myopia (b6) is not significant at 
conventional levels, indicating that compensation committees do not address the CEOs’ short-term earnings 
concerns in their stock option decision making.  
 
The possible reason for the insignificant result of ∆R&D×Myopia may be that our sample differs from 
Cheng (2004). Cheng’s (2004) sample period is from 1984 to 1997, and our sample covers the period of 1992-2006. 
The granting pattern of compensation committees might change with time. Furthermore, Cheng (2004) uses 160 
R&D-intensive firms in Forbes 500 list, while we select a sample of 954 firms from the Standard & Poor’s 1500. 
Therefore, his results merely apply to R&D-intensive firms. And the findings in this study have implications for both 
R&D intensive firms and non-R&D-intensive firms.  
 
Overall, the findings in Table 4 suggest that firms with greater growth opportunities and firms with lower 
financial leverage are more likely to award CEO stock options to motivate R&D investment. However, contrary to 
our prediction, compensation committees tend to grant more to CEOs with significant stock ownership to induce 
R&D spending. A potential explanation for this finding is that CEOs with significant stock ownership affect the 
contracting process and grant themselves with more options.  
                                                        
5 We also use the fixed effect model by adding year dummy variables. The results (untabulated) are qualitatively unchanged. 
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Table 4 
Regression results of Model (1) 
 
∆CEO_OPit = b0 + b1∆R&Dit + b2∆R&Dit×Tobin’s Qit + b3∆R&Dit×Leverageit + b4∆R&Dit×Stock_Ownit + b5∆R&Dit×Horizonit 
+ b6∆R&Dit ×Myopiait + b7Returnit + єit        (1) 
 
 Predicted sign  
Coefficient estimate 
 
While-adjusted t-statistic 
Intercept ? -0.161*** -5.89 
∆R&D + 0.921 0.93 
∆R&D×Tobin’Q + 0.060** 2.12 
∆R&D×Leverage - - 0.358*** -3.24 
∆R&D×Stock_Own - 0.143** 1.99 
∆R&D×Horizon + 0.648** 1.93 
∆R&D×Myopia + 0.022 0.31 
Return + 0.001*** 3.47 
Adj. R2                            9.38% 
*,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively, based on one-tailed tests of signed predictions, two-tailed 
otherwise.  
Variables are defined in Table 2.  
 
 
7.  Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper examines compensation committees’ strategies of using stock options to motivate R&D 
investments. The findings suggest that firms do consider their investment and financing conditions when they make 
decisions in stock option grants. Specifically, when firms face greater growth opportunities and when firms are less 
financially levered, compensation committees are more likely to intensify the association between their CEO stock 
option granting decisions and CEOs’ decisions on R&D investment. These findings are consistent with that options 
are designed effectively to motivate managerial risk taking, thereby aligning the interests of managers with those of 
shareholders. However, contrary to our prediction, compensation committees tend to grant more stock options to 
reward or motivate R&D spending when the CEOs hold large stock ownership. One potential explanation for this 
granting behavior is that CEOs affect compensation decisions when they own a large portion of firm stocks.   
 
Several potential opportunities for future research arise from this study. First, the empirical evidence 
provided in this paper may suggest that CEOs with significant stock ownership affects the option granting process. 
Future empirical research might seek supporting evidence on this conjecture. Second, future research could also 
provide insights on whether and how board of director independence affects the effectiveness of stock option grants. 
Third, due to data limitations, we do not address the granting patterns in regulated industries. Future studies might 
investigate stock option grants practice in such industries.  
 
Data Availability:  Data used in this study are publicly available from the sources identified in the paper. 
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